



CERTIK

Bifrost Finance

Security Assessment

November 27th, 2020

For :

Bifrost Finance @ [Bifrost](#)



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- A document describing in detail an in depth analysis of a particular piece(s) of source code provided to CertiK by a Client.
- An organized collection of testing results, analysis and inferences made about the structure, implementation and overall best practices of a particular piece of source code.
- Representation that a Client of CertiK has indeed completed a round of auditing with the intention to increase the quality of the company/product's IT infrastructure and or source code.



## Overview

### Project Summary

<b>Project Name</b>	<a href="#">bifrost-finance</a>
<b>Description</b>	An ERC20 token and Mint Drop Contract
<b>Platform</b>	Ethereum; Solidity
<b>Codebase</b>	<a href="#">bifrost-mint-drop</a>
<b>Commit</b>	<a href="#">52e2be1422fc69400f91ea0700f13803dd75de66d42fd40673bffe61b738459113b11cc3efd9139241585a78c93f10a7289a1a3bfe0f6541443f0d40</a>

## Audit Summary

<b>Delivery Date</b>	Nov. 27, 2020
<b>Method of Audit</b>	Static Analysis, Manual Review
<b>Consultants Engaged</b>	2
<b>Timeline</b>	Nov. 25, 2020 - Nov. 27, 2020

## Vulnerability Summary

<b>Total Issues</b>	7
<b>Total Critical</b>	1
<b>Total Major</b>	0
<b>Total Minor</b>	1
<b>Total Informational</b>	5



## Executive Summary

This report has been prepared for **Bifrost Finance** to discover issues and vulnerabilities in the source code of their Smart Contract as well as any contract dependencies that were not part of an officially recognized library. A comprehensive examination has been performed, utilizing Dynamic Analysis, Static Analysis, and Manual Review techniques.

The auditing process pays special attention to the following considerations:

- Testing the smart contracts against both common and uncommon attack vectors.
- Assessing the codebase to ensure compliance with current best practices and industry standards.
- Ensuring contract logic meets the specifications and intentions of the client.
- Cross referencing contract structure and implementation against similar smart contracts produced by industry leaders.
- Thorough line-by-line manual review of the entire codebase by industry experts.



## Documentation

The sources of truth regarding the operation of the contracts in scope were lackluster and are something we advise to be enriched to aid in the legibility of the codebase as well as project. To help aid our understanding of each contract's functionality we referred to in-line comments and naming conventions.

These were considered the specification, and when discrepancies arose with the actual code behaviour, we consulted with the **Bifrost Finance** or reported an issue.

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## Review Notes

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The audited commits are

[52e2be1422fc69400f91ea0700f13803dd75de66](#) , [d42fd40673bffe61b738459113b11cc3efd91392,41585a78c93f10a7289a1a3bfe0f6541443f0d40](#)

and the files included in the scope are [MintDrop.sol](#), [vETH.sol](#) and [IVETH.sol](#).

Certain optimization steps that we pinpointed in the source code mostly referred to coding standards and inefficiencies, however 1 critical and 1 minor vulnerabilities were identified during our audit that solely concerns the specification.

Certain discrepancies between the expected specification and the implementation of it were identified and were relayed to the team, however they pose no type of vulnerability and concern an optional code path that was unaccounted for.

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## Recommendations

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Overall, the codebase of the contracts should be refactored to assimilate the findings of this report, enforce linters and / or coding styles as well as correct any spelling errors and mistakes that appear throughout the code to achieve a high standard of code quality and security.

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## Findings

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ID	Title	Type	Severity
EXH-01	Unlocked Compiler Version Declaration	Optimization	Informational
EXH-02	Proper Usage of "public" and "external" type	Coding Style	Informational
EXH-03	Gas Consumption	Optimization	Informational
EXH-04	Gas Consumption	Optimization	Informational
EXH-05	Dangerous require	Optimization	Critical
EXH-06	Code optimization	Optimization	Informational
EXH-07	Incorrect Rewards Calculation	Optimization	Minor



## Exhibit-01: Unlocked Compiler Version Declaration

Type	Severity	Location
Language Sepcific	Informational	<a href="https://IVETH.sol">IVETH.sol</a>

### Description:

The compiler version utilized in several files uses the "^" prefix specifier, denoting that a compiler version which is greater than the version will be used to compile the contracts.

The compiler version utilized in other files uses the "<=" prefix specifier, denoting that a compiler version which is smaller than the version will be used to compile the contracts.

Recommend the compiler version should be consistent throughout the codebase.

### Recommendation:

It is a general practice to instead lock the compiler at a specific version rather than allow a range of compiler versions to be utilized to avoid compiler-specific bugs and be able to identify ones more easily. We recommend locking the compiler at the lowest possible version that supports all the capabilities wished by the codebase. This will ensure that the project utilizes a compiler version that has been in use for the longest time and as such is less likely to contain yet-undiscovered bugs.

**(Biforst - Resolved)** The issue is addressed in commit [d42fd40673bffe61b738459113b11cc3efd91392](https://github.com/IVETH/sol/blob/d42fd40673bffe61b738459113b11cc3efd91392).



## Exhibit-02: Proper Usage of "public" and "external" type

Type	Severity	Location
Coding Style	Informational	<a href="#">MintDrop.sol</a>

### Description:

"public" functions that are never called by the contract should be declared "external" . When the inputs are arrays "external" functions are more efficient than "public" functions. [link](#)

Examples:

Functions like : `getRewards()`

### Recommendation:

Consider using the "external" attribute for functions never called from the contract.

**(Biforst - Resolved)** The issue is addressed in commit [d42fd40673bffe61b738459113b11cc3efd91392](#).



## Exhibit-03: Gas consumption

Type	Severity	Location
Optimization	Informational	<a href="#">MintDrop.sol L37</a> , <a href="#">MintDrop.sol L39</a>

### Description:

Below variables change only once, better to define it as immutable to avoid gas consumption.

```
address public vETHAddress;  
address public depositAddress;  
uint public bonusStartAt;
```

### Recommendation:

We recommend to change the codes as below:

```
address public immutable vETHAddress;  
address public immutable depositAddress;  
uint public immutable bonusStartAt;
```

**(Biforst - Resolved)** The issue is addressed in commit [d42fd40673bffe61b738459113b11cc3efd91392](#).



## Exhibit-04: Gas consumption

Type	Severity	Location
Optimization	Informational	<a href="#">MintDrop.sol L139</a>

### Description:

The function `lockWithdraw()` could add the modifier `isWithdrawNotLocked` to save gas in case of multiple calls.

### Recommendation:

We recommend to add the modifier `isWithdrawNotLocked`.

```
function lockWithdraw() external onlyOwner isWithdrawNotLocked {}
```

**(Biforst - Resolved)** The issue is addressed in commit [d42fd40673bffe61b738459113b11cc3efd91392](#).



## Exhibit-05: Dangerous require

Type	Severity	Location
Optimization	Critical	<a href="#">MintDrop.sol L139</a>

### Description:

Because of the condition at line 123, the function `lockForValidator()` may never succeed.

Neither contracts nor “external accounts” are currently able to prevent that someone sends them Ether. Contracts can react on and reject a regular transfer, but there are ways to move Ether without creating a message call. One way is to simply “mine to” the contract address and the second way is using `selfdestruct(x)` [.link](#)

### Recommendation:

We recommend to change it like this or simply delete it.

```
require(address(this).balance.add(totalLocked) >= totalDeposit, "invalid balance");
```

**(Biforst - Resolved)** The issue is addressed in commit [d42fd40673bffe61b738459113b11cc3efd91392](https://github.com/0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000/commit/d42fd40673bffe61b738459113b11cc3efd91392).

## Exhibit-06: Code optimization

Type	Severity	Location
Optimization	Informational	<a href="#">MintDrop.sol L96</a>

### Description:

Since the reward is calculated after the start time, it is better to compare it to the `bonusStartAt` instead of comparing with `0`.

### Recommendation:

We recommend to change it like this.

```
if (now < bonusStartAt) {
    if (myLastClaimedAt[msg.sender] < bonusStartAt) {
        myLastClaimedAt[msg.sender] = bonusStartAt;
    }
    return;
}
if (myLastClaimedAt[msg.sender] >= bonusStartAt) {}
```

**(Biforst - Resolved)** The issue is addressed in commit [d42fd40673bffe61b738459113b11cc3efd91392](https://github.com/0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000/commit/d42fd40673bffe61b738459113b11cc3efd91392).



## Exhibit-07: Incorrect Rewards Calculation

Type	Severity	Location
Optimization	Minor	<a href="#">MintDrop.sol</a>

### Description:

In `MintDrop` contract, users must consistently call the function `claimRewards()`. Otherwise the `rewards` is incorrectly calculated.

Example:

User A deposited 1 ether on the first day, no other users deposited until the end of the 7th day.

If user A claim rewards at the end of the 7th day, he will get 100% of the total rewards for 7 days.



If user A forgot to claim rewards, and in the 8th day user B deposited 99 ethers.

At the end of the 8th day, user A claimed rewards, and he will only get down to 1% of the total rewards for all 8 days.

**(Biforst - Response)** This rewards calculation is not entirely fair, but it is relatively simple to calculate.