

CERTIK VERIFICATION REPORT FOR CONTENTOS



Request Date: 2019-04-15
Revision Date: 2019-04-28

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PASS

CERTIK believes this smart contract passes security qualifications to be listed on digital asset exchanges.

Apr 28, 2019



Summary

This audit report summarises the smart contract verification service requested by ContentOS. The goal of this security audit is to guarantee that the audited smart contracts are robust enough to avoid any potential security loopholes.

The result of this report is only a reflection of the source code that was determined in this scope, and of the source code at the time of the audit.

Type of Issues

CertiK smart label engine applied 100% covered formal verification labels on the source code, and scanned the code using our proprietary static analysis and formal verification engine to detect the follow type of issues.

Title	Description	Issues	SWC ID
Integer Overflow and Underflow	An overflow/underflow happens when an arithmetic operation reaches the maximum or minimum size of a type.	0	SWC-101
Function incorrectness	Function implementation does not meet the specification, leading to intentional or unintentional vulnerabilities.	0	
Buffer Overflow	An attacker is able to write to arbitrary storage locations of a contract if array of out bound happens	0	SWC-124
Reentrancy	A malicious contract can call back into the calling contract before the first invocation of the function is finished.	0	SWC-107
Transaction Order Dependence	A race condition vulnerability occurs when code depends on the order of the transactions submitted to it.	0	SWC-114
Timestamp Dependence	Timestamp can be influenced by minors to some degree.	4	SWC-116

Insecure Compiler Version	Com-	Using an fixed outdated compiler version or floating pragma can be problematic, if there are publicly disclosed bugs and issues that affect the current compiler version used.	2	SWC-102 SWC-103
Insecure Randomness	Ran-	Block attributes are insecure to generate random numbers, as they can be influenced by minors to some degree.	0	SWC-120
“tx.origin” for authorization	for	tx.origin should not be used for authorization. Use msg.sender instead.	0	SWC-115
Delegatecall to Untrusted Callee	to	Calling into untrusted contracts is very dangerous, the target and arguments provided must be sanitized.	0	SWC-112
State Variable Default Visibility	Variable	Labeling the visibility explicitly makes it easier to catch incorrect assumptions about who can access the variable.	0	SWC-108
Function Default Visibility	Default	Functions are public by default. A malicious user is able to make unauthorized or unintended state changes if a developer forgot to set the visibility.	0	SWC-100
Uninitialized variables		Uninitialized local storage variables can point to other unexpected storage variables in the contract.	0	SWC-109
Assertion Failure		The assert() function is meant to assert invariants. Properly functioning code should never reach a failing assert statement.	0	SWC-110
Deprecated Solidity Features		Several functions and operators in Solidity are deprecated and should not be used as best practice.	0	SWC-111
Unused variables		Unused variables reduce code quality	0	

Review Details

Source Code SHA-256 Checksum

- **lock_linear.sol** 4225963563907cc509e5827fcc329073cdc6b9cefba3da713bc3e7d1540e59a6
- **lock_nonlinear.sol** f09b94f509d104f171fd74761db812da1ffb58e759692259861c9da0401888f3
- **lock_reward.sol** ** 1a5d7eeac6454710623a0929ae6b0867672f11ca84e4f698f6d479d546049132

Summary

CertiK team is invited by The ContentOS team to audit the design and implementations of its TimeLock and Vesting Contracts, and the source code has been analyzed under different perspectives and with different tools such as CertiK formal verification checkings as well as manual reviews by smart contract experts. We have been actively interacting with client-side engineers when there was any potential loopholes or recommended design changes during the audit process, and ContentOS team has been actively giving us updates for the source code and feedback about the business logics.

We suggest more unit test cases to be added into the repository to simulate different release token scenarios to those `benefinaries`. i.e: release in the linear fashion- constant amount && release in non-linear fashion - cliff vesting.

Meanwhile, it is recommended to have a more well-detailed document for the public to describe the source code specifications and implementations.

Overall we found the ContentOS team is very professional, provide with well-detailed document for the public to describe the source code specifications and implementations. The contracts follow good practices, with reasonable amount of features on top of the ERC20 related to administrative controls by the token issuer. With the final update of source code and delivery of the audit report, we conclude that the contract is not vulnerable to any classically known antipatterns or security issues. The audit report itself is not necessarily a guarantee of correctness or trustworthiness, and we always recommend seeking multiple opinions, more test coverage and sandbox deployments before the mainnet release.

Recommandation

Items in this section are low impact to the overall aspects of the smart contracts, thus will let client to decide whether to have those reflected in the final deployed version of source codes.

`lock_linear.sol`

- `isAuthorized()` – can be simplified to `return owner == src;`
- `set_lock_info()`
 - `set_lock_info()` can be modified many time before the `lock()` is called, `dataArray.push(tmp * days_of_month)` keep `dataArray` increasing, instead start from index 0.
- `set_beneficiary()` – Ensure the address `b` is not zero contract
- `require()` – after version 0.4.22, `require()` allow to optional message for giving more context to the user about what type of condition is not match i.e: `require(_to != address(0), "invalid, _to is a zero address")`

`lock_nonlinear.sol`

- `isAuthorized()` – can be simplified to


```
return src == owner
;
```
- `release_specific()` –
 - **line 111:** `require(false);` is not given enough information about the condition is not meet to the user. Adding messages definitely could help for further investigation purpose. i.e. `require(false, "index must be between 1 - 4");`

For every issues found, CertiK categorizes them into 3 buckets based on its risk level:

- **Critical:** The code implementation does not match the specification, or it could result in loss of funds for contract owner or users.
- **Medium:** The code implementation does not match the specification at certain condition, or it could affect the security standard by lost of access control.
- **Low:** The code implementation is not a best practice, or use a suboptimal design pattern, which may lead to security vulnerability, but no concern found yet.

Source Code with CertiK Labels

File lock_nonlinear.sol

```
1 pragma solidity ^0.4.24;
2
3 contract DAO {
4     function balanceOf(address addr) public returns (uint);
5 }
6
7 interface RegisterInterface {
8     function register(string);
9 }
10
11 // auth
12 contract Auth {
13     address public owner;
14     /*@CTK Auth
15     @post __post.owner == msg.sender
16     */
17     constructor () public {
18         owner = msg.sender;
19     }
20
21     modifier auth {
22         require(isAuthorized(msg.sender) == true);
23         -;
24     }
25
26     /*@CTK isAuthorized
27     @post __return == (src == owner)
28     */
29     function isAuthorized(address src) internal view returns (bool) {
30         if(src == owner){
31             return true;
32         } else {
33             return false;
34         }
35     }
36 }
37
38 contract TokenTimelock is Auth{
39
40     constructor() public {
41         beneficiary = msg.sender;
42     }
43
44     uint constant public days_of_month = 30;
45
46     uint public firstTime = 0;
47     uint public secondTime = 0;
48     uint public thirdTime = 0;
49     uint public fourthTime = 0;
50     mapping (uint => bool) public release_map;
51
52     uint256 public totalFutureRelease = 0;
53
54 }
```

```

55 // cosToken address,
56 address constant public contract_addr = 0x589891a198195061cb8ad1a75357a3b7dbadd7bc
    ;
57
58 address public beneficiary;
59
60 uint    public startTime;
61 bool    public lockStart = false;
62
63 // set total cos to lock
64 /*@CTK set_total
65   @tag assume_completion
66   @post !lockStart
67   @post msg.sender == owner
68   @post __post.totalFutureRelease == total
69 */
70 function set_total(uint256 total) auth public {
71     require(lockStart == false);
72     totalFutureRelease = total;
73 }
74
75 // set month to release
76 /*@CTK set_release_month
77   @tag no_overflow
78   @post __post.firstTime == months1 * days_of_month
79   @post __post.secondTime == months2 * days_of_month
80   @post __post.thirdTime == months3 * days_of_month
81   @post __post.fourthTime == months4 * days_of_month
82 */
83 function set_release_month(int months1,int months2,int months3,int months4) auth
    public {
84     require(lockStart == false);
85     require(months1 > 0);
86     require(months2 > 0);
87     require(months3 > 0);
88     require(months4 > 0);
89     firstTime = uint(months1) * days_of_month;
90     secondTime = uint(months2) * days_of_month;
91     thirdTime = uint(months3) * days_of_month;
92     fourthTime = uint(months4) * days_of_month;
93
94     require(firstTime < secondTime );
95     require(secondTime < thirdTime);
96     require(thirdTime < fourthTime);
97 }
98
99 // when transfer certain balance to this contract address, we can call lock
100 /*@CTK lock
101   @tag assume_completion
102   @post !lockStart
103   @post firstTime != 0
104   @post secondTime != 0
105   @post thirdTime != 0
106   @post fourthTime != 0
107   @post __post.startTime == block.timestamp + offsetMinutes * 60
108   @post __post.lockStart
109 */
110 // function lock(int offsetMinutes) auth public returns(bool) {

```



```
111 function lock(uint offsetMinutes) auth public returns(bool) {
112     require(lockStart == false);
113     require(firstTime != 0);
114     require(secondTime != 0);
115     require(thirdTime != 0);
116     require(fourthTime != 0);
117     require(offsetMinutes >= 0);
118
119     DAO cosTokenApi = DAO(contract_addr);
120     uint256 balance = cosTokenApi.balanceOf(address(this));
121     require(balance == totalFutureRelease);
122
123     startTime = block.timestamp + uint(offsetMinutes) * 1 minutes;
124     lockStart = true;
125 }
126
127 /*@CTK set_benificiary
128    @tag assume_completion
129    @post msg.sender == owner
130    @post __post.benificiary == b
131    */
132 function set_benificiary(address b) auth public {
133     benificiary = b;
134 }
135
136 function release_specific(uint index,uint i) private {
137     if (release_map[i] == true) {
138         emit mapCheck(true,i);
139         return;
140     }
141     emit mapCheck(false,i);
142
143     DAO cosTokenApi = DAO(contract_addr);
144     uint256 balance = cosTokenApi.balanceOf(address(this));
145     uint256 eachRelease = 0;
146     if (index == 1) {
147         eachRelease = totalFutureRelease / 10;
148     } else if (index >= 2 && index <= 4) {
149         eachRelease = (totalFutureRelease / 10) * 3;
150     } else {
151         require(false);
152     }
153
154     bool ok = balance >= eachRelease;
155     emit balanceCheck(ok,balance);
156     require(balance >= eachRelease);
157
158     bool success = contract_addr.call(bytes4(keccak256("transfer(address,uint256)"))
159         ),benificiary,eachRelease);
160     emit tokenTransfer(success);
161     require(success);
162     release_map[i] = true;
163 }
164
165 event mapCheck(bool ok,uint window);
166 event balanceCheck(bool ok,uint256 balance);
167 event tokenTransfer(bool success);
```

```

168 function release() auth public {
169     require(lockStart == true);
170     require(release_map[fourthTime] == false);
171     uint theDay = dayFor();
172     // release day must be after lock day
173     require(theDay > firstTime);
174
175     if ( theDay > firstTime && theDay <= secondTime) {
176         release_specific(1,firstTime);
177     } else if (theDay > secondTime && theDay <= thirdTime) {
178         release_specific(1,firstTime);
179         release_specific(2,secondTime);
180     } else if (theDay > thirdTime && theDay <= fourthTime) {
181         release_specific(1,firstTime);
182         release_specific(2,secondTime);
183         release_specific(3,thirdTime);
184     } else if (theDay > fourthTime) {
185         release_specific(1,firstTime);
186         release_specific(2,secondTime);
187         release_specific(3,thirdTime);
188         release_specific(4,fourthTime);
189     }
190 }
191
192     // days after lock
193     /*@CTK dayFor
194     @post block.timestamp < startTime -> __return == 0
195     @post block.timestamp >= startTime -> __return == (block.timestamp - startTime)
196         / 86400 + 1
197     */
198     function dayFor() view public returns (uint) {
199         uint timestamp = block.timestamp;
200         return timestamp < startTime ? 0 : (timestamp - startTime) / 1 days + 1;
201     }
202
203     function regist(string key) auth public {
204         RegisterInterface(contract_addr).register(key);
205     }

```

File lock_linear.sol

```

1 pragma solidity ^0.4.24;
2
3 contract DAO {
4     /*@CTK balanceOf
5     @tag spec
6     @post __return == 5
7     */
8     function balanceOf(address addr) public returns (uint);
9 }
10
11 interface RegisterInterface {
12     function register(string);
13 }
14
15 // auth
16 contract Auth {
17     address public owner;

```

```
18  /*@CTK Auth
19  @post __post.owner == msg.sender
20  */
21  constructor () public {
22      owner = msg.sender;
23  }
24
25  modifier auth {
26      require(isAuthorized(msg.sender) == true);
27      _;
28  }
29
30  /*@CTK isAuthorized
31  @post __return == (src == owner)
32  */
33  function isAuthorized(address src) internal view returns (bool) {
34      if(src == owner){
35          return true;
36      } else {
37          return false;
38      }
39  }
40 }
41
42 contract TokenTimelock is Auth{
43     /*@CTK TokenTimeLock
44     @post __post.benificiary == msg.sender
45     */
46     constructor() public {
47         benificiary = msg.sender;
48     }
49
50     uint constant public days_of_month = 30;
51
52     uint[] public dataArray;
53     uint public release_percent = 0;
54
55     mapping (uint => bool) public release_map;
56     uint256 public totalFutureRelease = 0;
57
58     // cosToken address,
59     address constant public contract_addr = 0x589891a198195061cb8ad1a75357a3b7dbadd7bc
60         ;
61     address public benificiary;
62     uint public startTime;
63     bool public lockStart = false;
64
65     // set total cos to lock
66     /*@CTK set_total
67     @tag assume_completion
68     @post !lockStart
69     @post msg.sender == owner
70     @post __post.totalFutureRelease == total
71     */
72     function set_total(uint256 total) auth public {
73         require(lockStart == false);
74         totalFutureRelease = total;
75     }
76 }
```

```
75
76 // set month to release
77 function set_lock_info(int startMonth,int periods,int percent,int gap) auth public
    {
78     require(lockStart == false);
79     require(startMonth > 0);
80     require(periods > 0);
81     require(percent > 0);
82     require(gap > 0);
83     require(periods * percent == 100);
84     release_percent = uint(percent);
85     uint tmp = uint(startMonth);
86     delete dateArray;
87     /*CTK ForLoop_set_lock_info
88      @inv dateArray[dateArray.length - 1] == tmp__pre * days_of_month
89      @inv tmp == tmp__pre + gap
90      @inv i < periods
91      @inv gap == gap__pre
92      @inv periods == periods__pre
93      @post i == periods
94      @post !__should_return
95      */
96     for (int i = 0; i < periods; i++) {
97         dateArray.push(tmp * days_of_month);
98         tmp += uint(gap);
99     }
100 }
101
102 // when transfer certain balance to this contract address, we can call lock
103 function lock(int offsetMinutes) auth public returns(bool) {
104     require(lockStart == false);
105     require(offsetMinutes >= 0);
106     for(uint i = 0; i < dateArray.length; i++) {
107         require(dateArray[i] != 0);
108     }
109     require(release_percent != 0);
110     require(totalFutureRelease != 0);
111
112     DAO cosTokenApi = DAO(contract_addr);
113     uint256 balance = cosTokenApi.balanceOf(address(this));
114     require(balance == totalFutureRelease);
115
116     startTime = block.timestamp + uint(offsetMinutes) * 1 minutes;
117     lockStart = true;
118 }
119
120 /*@CTK set_benificiary
121  @tag assume_completion
122  @post msg.sender == owner
123  @post __post.benificiary == b
124  */
125 function set_benificiary(address b) auth public {
126     benificiary = b;
127 }
128
129 function release_specific(uint i) private {
130     if (release_map[i] == true) {
131         emit mapCheck(true,i);
```

```

132     return;
133 }
134 emit mapCheck(false,i);
135
136 DAO cosTokenApi = DAO(contract_addr);
137 uint256 balance = cosTokenApi.balanceOf(address(this));
138 uint256 eachRelease = 0;
139 eachRelease = (totalFutureRelease / 100) * release_percent;
140
141 bool ok = balance >= eachRelease;
142 emit balanceCheck(ok,balance);
143 require(balance >= eachRelease);
144
145 bool success = contract_addr.call(bytes4(keccak256("transfer(address,uint256)"))
    ),beneficiary,eachRelease);
146 emit tokenTransfer(success);
147 require(success);
148 release_map[i] = true;
149 }
150
151 event mapCheck(bool ok,uint window);
152 event balanceCheck(bool ok,uint256 balance);
153 event tokenTransfer(bool success);
154
155 function release() auth public {
156     require(lockStart == true);
157     require(release_map[dateArray[dateArray.length-1]] == false);
158     uint theDay = dayFor();
159
160     for (uint i=0; i<dateArray.length;i++) {
161         if(theDay > dateArray[i]) {
162             release_specific(dateArray[i]);
163         }
164     }
165 }
166
167     // days after lock
168     /*@CTK dayFor
169     @post block.timestamp < startTime -> __return == 0
170     @post block.timestamp >= startTime -> __return == (block.timestamp - startTime)
171     / 86400 + 1
172 */
173 function dayFor() view public returns (uint) {
174     uint timestamp = block.timestamp;
175     return timestamp < startTime ? 0 : (timestamp - startTime) / 1 days + 1;
176 }
177
178 function regist(string key) auth public {
179     RegisterInterface(contract_addr).register(key);
180 }

```

How to read

Detail for Request 1

transferFrom to same address


Verification date	 20, Oct 2018
Verification timespan	 395.38 ms

CERTIK label location	Line 30-34 in File howtoread.sol
-----------------------	----------------------------------

CERTIK label	30	<code>/*@CTK FAIL "transferFrom to same address"</code>
	31	<code>@tag assume_completion</code>
	32	<code>@pre from == to</code>
	33	<code>@post __post.allowed[from] [msg.sender] ==</code>
	34	<code>*/</code>

Raw code location	Line 35-41 in File howtoread.sol
-------------------	----------------------------------

Raw code	35	<code>function transferFrom(address from, address to</code>
		<code>) {</code>
	36	<code>balances[from] = balances[from].sub(tokens</code>
	37	<code>allowed[from] [msg.sender] = allowed[from] [</code>
	38	<code>balances[to] = balances[to].add(tokens);</code>
	39	<code>emit Transfer(from, to, tokens);</code>
	40	<code>return true;</code>
	41	<code>}</code>

Counterexample	 This code violates the specification
----------------	--

Initial environment	1	Counter Example:
	2	Before Execution:
	3	Input = {
	4	from = 0x0
	5	to = 0x0
	6	tokens = 0x6c
	7	}
	8	This = 0
	52	}
	53	balance: 0x0
	54	}
	55	}
	56	
Post environment	57	After Execution:
	58	Input = {
	59	from = 0x0
	60	to = 0x0
	61	tokens = 0x6c

Static Analysis Request

INSECURE_COMPILER_VERSION

Line 1 in File lock_nonlinear.sol


```
1 pragma solidity ^0.4.24;
```

 Only these compiler versions are safe to compile your code: 0.4.25

TIMESTAMP_DEPENDENCY

Line 124 in File lock_nonlinear.sol


```
124     startTime = block.timestamp + uint(offsetMinutes) * 1 minutes;
```

 "block.timestamp" can be influenced by minors to some degree

TIMESTAMP_DEPENDENCY

Line 199 in File lock_nonlinear.sol


```
199     uint timestamp = block.timestamp;
```

 "block.timestamp" can be influenced by minors to some degree

INSECURE_COMPILER_VERSION

Line 1 in File lock_linear.sol


```
1 pragma solidity ^0.4.24;
```

 Only these compiler versions are safe to compile your code: 0.4.25

TIMESTAMP_DEPENDENCY

Line 116 in File lock_linear.sol


```
116     startTime = block.timestamp + uint(offsetMinutes) * 1 minutes;
```

 "block.timestamp" can be influenced by minors to some degree

TIMESTAMP_DEPENDENCY

Line 173 in File lock_linear.sol


```
173     uint timestamp = block.timestamp;
```

 "block.timestamp" can be influenced by minors to some degree

Formal Verification Request 1

Auth

 28, Apr 2019

 6.6 ms

Line 14-16 in File lock_nonlinear.sol

```
14  /*@CTK Auth
15     @post  __post.owner == msg.sender
16  */
```

Line 17-19 in File lock_nonlinear.sol


```
17  constructor () public {
18      owner = msg.sender;
19  }
```

 The code meets the specification

Formal Verification Request 2

isAuthorized

 28, Apr 2019

 13.13 ms

Line 26-28 in File lock_nonlinear.sol

```
26  /*@CTK isAuthorized
27     @post  __return == (src == owner)
28  */
```

Line 29-35 in File lock_nonlinear.sol


```
29  function isAuthorized(address src) internal view returns (bool) {
30      if(src == owner){
31          return true;
32      } else {
33          return false;
34      }
35  }
```

 The code meets the specification

Formal Verification Request 3

set_total

 28, Apr 2019

 62.3 ms

Line 64-69 in File lock_nonlinear.sol


```
64  /*@CTK set_total
65     @tag assume_completion
66     @post !lockStart
67     @post msg.sender == owner
68     @post __post.totalFutureRelease == total
69  */
```

Line 70-73 in File lock_nonlinear.sol


```
70  function set_total(uint256 total) auth public {
71      require(lockStart == false);
72      totalFutureRelease = total;
73  }
```

✔ The code meets the specification

Formal Verification Request 4

lock

 28, Apr 2019

 114.69 ms

Line 100-109 in File lock_nonlinear.sol

```
100 /*@CTK lock
101     @tag assume_completion
102     @post !lockStart
103     @post firstTime != 0
104     @post secondTime != 0
105     @post thirdTime != 0
106     @post fourthTime != 0
107     @post __post.startTime == block.timestamp + offsetMinutes * 60
108     @post __post.lockStart
109  */
```

Line 111-126 in File lock_nonlinear.sol


```
111 function lock(uint offsetMinutes) auth public returns(bool) {
112     require(lockStart == false);
113     require(firstTime != 0);
114     require(secondTime != 0);
115     require(thirdTime != 0);
116     require(fourthTime != 0);
117     require(offsetMinutes >= 0);
118
119     DAO cosTokenApi = DAO(contract_addr);
120     uint256 balance = cosTokenApi.balanceOf(address(this));
121     require(balance == totalFutureRelease);
122
123     startTime = block.timestamp + uint(offsetMinutes) * 1 minutes;
124     lockStart = true;
125 }
```

✔ The code meets the specification

Formal Verification Request 5

set_beneficiary

 28, Apr 2019

 37.26 ms

Line 128-132 in File lock_nonlinear.sol

```
128 /*@CTK set_beneficiary
129     @tag assume_completion
130     @post msg.sender == owner
131     @post __post.beneficiary == b
132 */
```

Line 133-135 in File lock_nonlinear.sol


```
133 function set_beneficiary(address b) auth public {
134     beneficiary = b;
135 }
```

 The code meets the specification

Formal Verification Request 6

dayFor

 28, Apr 2019

 12.6 ms

Line 194-197 in File lock_nonlinear.sol

```
194 /*@CTK dayFor
195     @post block.timestamp < startTime -> __return == 0
196     @post block.timestamp >= startTime -> __return == (block.timestamp - startTime)
197     / 86400 + 1
198 */
```

Line 198-201 in File lock_nonlinear.sol


```
198 function dayFor() view public returns (uint) {
199     uint timestamp = block.timestamp;
200     return timestamp < startTime ? 0 : (timestamp - startTime) / 1 days + 1;
201 }
```

 The code meets the specification

Formal Verification Request 7

Auth

 28, Apr 2019

 6.6 ms

Line 18-20 in File lock_linear.sol

```
18  /*@CTK Auth
19     @post __post.owner == msg.sender
20  */
```

Line 21-23 in File lock_linear.sol

```
21  constructor () public {
22      owner = msg.sender;
23  }
```

✔ The code meets the specification

Formal Verification Request 8

isAuthorized

📅 28, Apr 2019

🕒 13.13 ms

Line 30-32 in File lock_linear.sol

```
30  /*@CTK isAuthorized
31     @post __return == (src == owner)
32  */
```

Line 33-39 in File lock_linear.sol

```
33  function isAuthorized(address src) internal view returns (bool) {
34      if(src == owner){
35          return true;
36      } else {
37          return false;
38      }
39  }
```

✔ The code meets the specification

Formal Verification Request 9

TokenTimeLock

📅 28, Apr 2019

🕒 8.79 ms

Line 43-45 in File lock_linear.sol

```
43  /*@CTK TokenTimeLock
44     @post __post.benificiary == msg.sender
45  */
```

Line 46-48 in File lock_linear.sol


```
46  constructor() public {
47      beneficiary = msg.sender;
48  }
```

✔ The code meets the specification

Formal Verification Request 10

set_total

 28, Apr 2019

 65.4 ms

Line 65-70 in File lock_linear.sol

```
65  /*@CTK set_total
66     @tag assume_completion
67     @post !lockStart
68     @post msg.sender == owner
69     @post __post.totalFutureRelease == total
70     */
```

Line 71-74 in File lock_linear.sol


```
71  function set_total(uint256 total) auth public {
72      require(lockStart == false);
73      totalFutureRelease = total;
74  }
```

 The code meets the specification

Formal Verification Request 11

set_beneficiary

 28, Apr 2019

 37.96 ms

Line 120-124 in File lock_linear.sol

```
120 /*@CTK set_beneficiary
121     @tag assume_completion
122     @post msg.sender == owner
123     @post __post.beneficiary == b
124     */
```

Line 125-127 in File lock_linear.sol


```
125 function set_beneficiary(address b) auth public {
126     beneficiary = b;
127 }
```

 The code meets the specification

Formal Verification Request 12

dayFor

 28, Apr 2019

 12.72 ms

Line 168-171 in File lock_linear.sol

```
168  /*@CTK dayFor
169     @post block.timestamp < startTime -> __return == 0
170     @post block.timestamp >= startTime -> __return == (block.timestamp - startTime)
171     / 86400 + 1
    */
```

Line 172-175 in File lock_linear.sol

```
172  function dayFor() view public returns (uint) {
173      uint timestamp = block.timestamp;
174      return timestamp < startTime ? 0 : (timestamp - startTime) / 1 days + 1;
175  }
```

✔ The code meets the specification